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Comments by Richard Arneson1  
 
Over the past two decades or so, Thomas Pogge has produced creative, 
insightful, provocative, and plausible analyses of a momentously important 
issue: what do wealthy countries and wealthy people owe to the global 
poor?  The core of his analysis is that whether or not we have positive du-
ties of beneficence to aid the poor is not so important.  This is so because we 
are anyway wrongfully harming the global poor. Negative duties not to 
harm are generally more stringent and binding than positive duties to aid, 
and in view of the magnitude of the harms that severe poverty induces, 
wrongfully inflicting severe poverty on people is grievously wrong. 
His account of how wealthy countries and people harm the poor is 
complicated.  In brief, people in wealthy countries support and benefit from 
an institutional order that harms the poor.  There is a human right, recog-
nized to some degree in current international law, that people not suffer se-
vere poverty.  This means that it is of sufficient moral importance that peo-
ple have secure access to an adequate standard of living to justify duties 
that fall on other people—collectives and individual—to ensure that people 
do have secure access.  The duties here are duties to respect, protect, facili-
tate, and provide.  But you don’t violate the right in question when you just 
refrain from acting, when you could, to help fulfill the right.  A right could 
be unfulfilled even though no one violates it. Pogge writes that there is a 
violation ―only if there are one or more human agents who are bringing 
about the un-fulfillment of the human right in question even while they 
could and should have known that their conduct would have this result ― 
(9).  Being a bystander does not suffice to make you a rights violator; you 
must act in a way that foreseeably causes non-fulfillment, and there must 
be some alternative action available to you that would instead fulfill or bet-
ter fulfill the right in question at a cost to you that is not disproportionate to 
what is at stake. 
Pogge’s account of how we nowadays massively violate the human 
rights of the poor weaves together controversial empirical claims.2  This 
comment sets these empirical issues aside and focuses on some moral is-
sues. 
Some people, including me, hold that ―we‖ (well-off people) are strictly 
                                                 
1. Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego. 
2. On the empirical issues, see, for example, Joshua Cohen, Philosophy, Social Science, Global 
Poverty, in THOMAS POGGE AND HIS CRITICS (Alison M. Jaggar, ed., 2010).  
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obligated to aid the poor because very often aiding would bring about a 
better outcome than what would occur if we instead did anything else.  The 
correct morality is act consequentialism: One morally ought always to do 
some act, among the available alternatives, that would bring about an out-
come no worse than what would have been brought about if one had in-
stead done anything else.3  Pogge disagrees. He accepts a conventional non-
consequentialist morality.   Let’s not challenge this.  For purposes of this 
discussion we assume that the fundamental moral principles that determine 
what one ought to do include deontological constraints and options: Each 
person has a Scheffler prerogative to pursue her own projects and aims, up 
to some point, even when doing that does not lead to greater good, and 
each of us is bound up to some point by constraints against wrongfully 
harming others even when doing so would lead to greater good.  Accepting 
that framework, the question is still open, whether a moral duty of benefi-
cence is a major component of morality.  I shall also assume, following R.M. 
Hare, that in nonconsequentialist morality there are different levels of mor-
al thinking, a level of fundamental principles that determines what we 
ought to do, and further levels, of law, social norms, and public morality, 
that are roughly speaking to be assessed as tools for promoting the fulfill-
ment of fundamental level principles.4   This discussion stays at the funda-
mental principle level. 
To appreciate some of the interesting innovations in Pogge’s proposals, 
consider a claim advanced by Robert Nozick in 1974.5  Nozick asks us to 
consider two people who have nothing to do with each other.  Maybe they 
live on separate islands.  They could interact.  One is better off, one worse 
off.  Nozick says that if the better off person legitimately owns her property 
and has no strict enforceable moral duty of beneficence to help alleviate the 
plight of the worse off person, then merely interacting by engaging in mu-
tually voluntary mutually beneficial trades does not trigger new demand-
ing duties on the part of the better off person to improve the condition of 
the worse off person.  This result holds even if trade relations become sta-
ble:  just engaging in trade does not somehow trigger the application of 
egalitarian norms such as the difference principle. 
Pogge disagrees.  He denies the premise, that in this scenario the prop-
erty holdings of the better off person are (likely to be) morally legitimate, 
                                                 
3. To a first approximation, this is Peter Singer’s view. Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence, and Mo-
rality, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 229 (1972).  Singer in this essay does not quite espouse act utili-
tarianism, or any version of act consequentialism, but the differences between act utilitarian-
ism and what he is committed to in that essay are minor. (One large question, though, is 
whether in being committed to act consequentialism as what morality requires one is thereby 
committed to act consequentialism as an account of practical reason—of what one has reason 
to do all things considered. 
4. R. M. HARE, MORAL THINKING: ITS LEVELS, METHOD, AND POINT (1981).  ―Roughly speaking,‖ 
because a deontological account of levels of moral thinking will choose derivative level norms 
not simply according to the (deontically weighted) consequences of their acceptance and im-
plementation, but also by giving weight to respecting constraints in the process of establishing 
the norms at the derivative level and sustaining them in operation at that level. 
5. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA at ch. 3 (1974). 
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given a bloody world history filled with conquests and massacres and co-
lonial empires.  Even if we forget the distant past and restrict our attention 
to recent history, we cannot use Nozick’s thought experiment as a guide to 
what we owe the global poor, because our current wealth derives from re-
cent immoral conduct.   Pogge also denies Nozick’s claim that interacting 
with someone when you have no prior duty to aid that person cannot trig-
ger the application of new egalitarian duties.  He asserts that there is a hu-
man right to access to a decent standard of living, that if you do not have 
anything to do with a person you do not violate this right, but if you do in-
teract, your acts affecting the person count as harming her if they make the 
person foreseeably worse off than she would be if rights were fulfilled pro-
vided the cost to you of not harming with respect to that baseline would 
not be too onerous. 
So suppose there is a human right to a decent standard of living and in 
Nozick’s example the worse-off person falls $10,000 below the standard.  
Again, according to Pogge, if you do not interact with the person at all and 
do not causally affect her in any way (you don’t emit polluting gases that 
foul her stream, for example), you violate no moral rights of the person.  
But if you interact, and you are very well off, and could, say trade a banana 
from the other person for $10,000, you are morally bound to interact on 
those terms and you violate the person’s human rights if you do not.  Sup-
pose instead you trade a banana for some mutually agreed mutually bene-
ficial price, say a dollar.  According to Pogge you harm the person by inter-
acting with the person in a way that foreseeably brings it about that his 
human right to access to a decent standard of living is unfulfilled when that 
is the morally required moral baseline for assessing whether wrongful 
harm is being inflict, given that you have available anther course of action 
that is not too costly for you and that would bring it about that the right is 
fulfilled.  Pogge thinks the odd feature of the situation in his characteriza-
tion of it is just a consequence of there being a morally important difference 
between doing and allowing and hence between being a bystander with re-
spect to a situation and doing something that affects the outcome. 
Some will agree with Pogge that when you have no moral duty to help 
someone, interacting with the person by way of mutually beneficial mutu-
ally agreed upon trade can count as a rights violation, because interaction 
triggers a higher standard of duty.6  (For example, many will agree that you 
have no duty to date or marry any other person, but if you do date or mar-
ry, a higher standard of duty is triggered. If you marry, you must marry on 
egalitarian terms.)  I disagree. 
Contrary to Pogge, what we should see is that you cannot generally de-
termine whether someone’s interaction with another counts as wrongfully 
harming that person unless you know what duties the person has or does 
                                                 
6. According to A. J. Julius, if you act toward another with the aim of inducing that person to 
act in a way that will redound to your benefit, special moral duties are triggered, that are 
dormant if you have nothing at all to do with the person.  See A.J. Julius, Basic Structure and the 
Value of Equality, 31 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 321 (2003). 
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not have to aid the person prior to any interaction.  If there is a moral duty 
to effect easy or moderately difficult rescue when you are uniquely situated 
to save a person from grave peril, then you should save the person without 
demanding payment for service, and if you refuse to save the person unless 
he agrees to payment, you are behaving wrongly, wrongfully harming the 
person.  If on the other hand there is no moral duty of beneficence that in-
cludes a duty to effect easy or moderately difficult rescue in these circum-
stances, then you are at liberty to negotiate with the person and charge a 
service for providing the service of saving him from peril.  If you are under 
no duty to aid the worse off person in Nozick’s isolated islanders example, 
then you do not wrongfully harm the person when you trade with the per-
son on mutually agreed upon and mutually beneficial terms even if that 
leaves the person very badly off. 
This simple point immediately casts a dark shadow on Pogge’s account 
of how the global international order harms the poor. If France has no duty 
to have anything at all to do with poor African farmers, it does no wrong to 
them when it erects trade barriers that ensure that only French farmers 
have the opportunity to sell food to French food consumers.  And no wrong 
is done when a French state agency, perhaps engaging in hard bargaining, 
strikes a deal with a consortium of poor African farmers, a deal that leaves 
the farmers in poverty when the French could afford to trade on terms that 
eliminate or greatly alleviate that poverty.  Of course, there are things the 
French can do that would wrongfully harm the French farmers even if there 
no duty of beneficence to improve their condition independently of interac-
tion.  If the French lie to the Belgians  so that a better food purchase trade 
deal that Belgians would have struck with the African farmers never gets 
made, that counts as wrongful harm for familiar reasons.  And there are 
other things the French could do that would unjustly distort the set of op-
tions for economic dealing that the African farmers face. 
Forget act consequentialism. Recall, we are accepting a nonconsequen-
tialist moral framework.  Still, what counts as wrongfully harming people 
by interacting with them can depend on whether one has strict moral duties 
to aid them independently of interaction.  I say, a reasonable nonconse-
quentialist morality should include a strong beneficence component, which 
will then constrain what it is morally acceptable for the better off person to 
do by way of negotiating and trading in Nozick’s example, and will con-
strain what it is morally acceptable for the French agencies to do by way of 
negotiating and trading with the poor African farmers just described.  What 
you cannot do is what, as I read him, Pogge does.  He says we can set to the 
side the issue of beneficence, because independently of whether there are 
positive duties of beneficence and what the shape of such a duty might be, 
we can show that we wealthy people are wrongfully harming the global 
poor in everyday actions by causing nonfulfillment of their human right to 
a decent standard of living. 
Turn now to a large and difficult topic, which cannot properly be ad-
dressed in a short comment.  What I will say just scratches the surface.  
4
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Pogge’s account of how the global order wrongfully harms the poor, and 
how, therefore, those who support and benefit from the global order 
wrongfully harm the poor, is fascinating, and raises many issues about the 
nature of deontological constraints and the nature of collective agency and 
responsibility and their relationship to individual agency and responsibil-
ity. To his credit, as others have observed, Pogge does not leave these larger 
issues hanging, he works out particular views on them and lays them out 
for his readers to ponder. 
For purposes of this discussion, let us accept collective agency and col-
lective responsibility.7  Let us assume it makes sense to claim, for example, 
that the U.S. initiated war on Iraq in 2003 and was morally wrong to do so, 
and that Wal-Mart ought to establish a network of retail stores selling 
goods at low prices in India and would be wrong to refrain from doing 
that.   However, nothing immediately follows about individual moral re-
sponsibility and individual moral agency.  There may be connections, or 
there may not be.  Moreover, in determining what moral constraints apply 
to an individual and what it is all things considered morally permissible, 
optional, and required for her to do, the operative idea is counterfactual 
dependency--what difference would it make if the agent did this rather 
than some other action available to her.  Actual causation is pretty much 
irrelevant, at most a minor consideration, in determining what the individ-
ual should, may, and must do.8  (Here I assume without argument that a 
David Lewis type counterfactual dependence account of causation is not 
the correct account of causation, but still might be highly relevant to an ac-
count of practical reason, what reasons we have for acting and omitting.) In 
considering these matters, we need to consider both evidence-relative and 
fact-relative understandings of moral permissibility and duty.  Also, we 
should allow that the agent’s motives matter in determining the moral 
permissibility or otherwise of what she does (as in the doctrine of double 
effect, for example). 
Here is the simplest example of divergence between collective assess-
ment of action and individual assessment.  Suppose that Michael and I are 
criminally conspiring to attack and murder Jeff.  Jeff has a right tot to be 
killed, which our killing him would violate.  We attack Jeff and kill him.  
The collective consisting of Dick and Michael has murdered Jeff, and has 
                                                 
7. On collective agency, see, e.g. Philip Pettit, Responsibility Incorporated, 117 ETHICS 171 (2007). 
For an example of someone who thinks we can read off individuals wrongdoing from the fact 
that the individual participates in a collective that is guilty of wrongdoing, see CHRISTOPHER 
KUTZ, COMPLICITY: ETHICS AND LAW FOR A COLLECTIVE AGE (2000). 
8. Here I believe I am following Shelly Kagan, Do I Make a Difference?, 39 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 
105 (2011), though Kagan is discussing consequentialist morality.  For an early statement of the 
idea that counterfactual dependence is what matters for the determination of the permissibility 
status of actions, see Jonathan Glover, It Makes No Difference Whether or Not I Do It, 49 
ARISTOTELIAN SOC. SUPP. VOL. 171 (1975). To my knowledge, no one has worked out what the 
counterfactual dependence account would imply for a deontological morality, but that proba-
bly just reflects limits of my knowledge of the relevant literature.  The idea that the David 
Lewis type view of causation, though inadequate as an account of causation, is clearly ade-
quate for practical reason, is forcefully argued by Christopher Hitchcock. 
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acted wrongly.  Did I actually do wrong in killing him?  Suppose I inten-
tionally fired the bullet that killed Jeff and I intended to bring about this re-
sult.  Surely I wrongly caused Jeff’s death and thus wrongfully killed him? 
Not necessarily.  Suppose that Michael and I are going to fire our guns at 
Jeff from opposite sides of a canyon.  In the situation, it is fixed, beyond my 
power to control, that Michael will shoot Jeff and that this shot will be, in 
the circumstances, sufficient to cause death.  I suddenly have a change of 
heart, before I commence shooting.  I want now only to do the right thing.  
But a quirky criminal boss has made a credible promise—if my bullet is the 
one that actually causes Jeff’s death, he will bring about some good effect--
say causing someone to be prevented from suffering the damage of a mild 
case of flu.  Suppose my only options are two: (1) shoot now and cause 
Jeff’s death, doing him no harm however (Michael’s bullet will certainly hit 
Jeff a half a second later and would cause death if my bullet does not), and 
bringing it about that the one person avoids the suffering of mild flu, or (2) 
refraining from shooting Jeff, which will do him no good at all, and will fail 
to bring it about that one person avoids the suffering of mild flu.    Since 
what deontological morality constrains me not to do is understood in terms 
of counterfactual dependence, deontological morality says I ought to kill 
Jeff in the circumstances as described.  (Of course, it was no doubt morally 
very wrong for me to have conspired with Michael in the past as I did.) Al-
so, the collective assessment of the shooting of Jeff is that the conspiratorial 
collective consisting of Dick and Michael wrongfully killed Jeff and was 
grievously morally wrong to do so. 
Second example: This is borrowed from Judith Thomson.9  Suppose I 
hand my wife what I believe is a glass of poison, intending to murder her.  
In fact the stuff is the medicine she must ingest immediately in order to 
save her life.  What I do is clearly morally wrong in the evidence-relative 
sense.  I say what I do is wrong in the fact-relative sense—I ought not hand 
my wife the medicine with the aim of killing her.  What I ought to do in the 
fact-relative sense is hand her the medicine with the aim of saving her life.  
If a third party sees me handing (what I think is poison but which is actual-
ly) medicine to my wife, and this bystander appreciates all the relevant 
facts, he should assist me in making sure my wife gets and ingests what is 
actually the needed medicine.  My acting wrongly, and culpably, in this sit-
uation shows up as relevant to what the bystander should do if we add a 
complication: Someone must die in this situation.  The bystander sees that I 
am about to give an involuntary twitch (of glee, say) that will startle my 
wife, causing her to drop the glass, just before she drinks the medicine. The 
bystander can save my wife’s life only by shooting me after I hand over the 
medicine but before I twitch.  The facts that I am acting in a way that is 
morally wrong and grievously culpable bring it about that it is morally re-
quired that the bystander act in a way that saves the life of the morally in-
                                                 
9. Judith Jarvis Thomson, Self-Defense, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 283 (1991).  My views on the 
nature of moral rights are heavily indebted to Thomson’s views, as articulated in such works 
as her THE REALM OF RIGHTS (1990). 
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nocent, my wife, at the expense of the morally culpable, me, given that 
someone must die.  What we must not say here is that I am not violating 
my wife’s rights in the fact-relative sense so I have not forfeited my own 
right to life, however bad my actions reveals my character to be, so the by-
stander would be violating my rights if he shot me to save my wife’s life, 
given that my involuntary twitch is not wrongful action on my part.   (In 
this example causation and counterfactual dependence run hand in hand.) 
Third example: This is a beneficence case.  There is a collective of 99 
people that is about to undertake a course of action that will save 1000 lives 
of people in peril.  I could join this collective, and if I do, it happens that my 
action will cause the saving of the 1000, but my joining and causing makes 
no difference to the outcome.  The collective will save exactly 1000 lives 
whether or not I join it.  I have a single alternative course of action: go off 
on a rescue operation of my own, which will save one life.  On a causal 
analysis, or alternatively on an analysis that says that if I join a collective 
and participate in its actions, the outcome of the doings of the collective is 
attributable to me (maybe I am assigned a per capita share of the total), the 
judgment is that I should not save the one but should join the collective.  
This would be wrong.  Insofar as I have any beneficence obligation, this is 
an obligation to make my action as effective as possible (for whatever 
amount of cost and effort deontological beneficence requires me to put 
forth). If I join the collective, my act makes no difference, results in zero net 
lives saved, whereas if I go off on my own, my act makes a difference, re-
sults in one extra life saved.  Again, causation does not matter to the deter-
mination of what I should do, and counterfactual dependence does.10 
Fourth example. Overdetermination Case.  This one involves Michael 
and Dick again, now acting independently, not in concert.  I aim to murder 
Jeff, and to achieve this end, I substitute sand for water in his canteen as he 
goes off on a desert hike.  In the circumstances, what I do, with evil intent, 
makes it the case that Jeff will die whatever Michael does, there is nothing 
that Michael or anyone else can do to save Jeff.  Now Michael shoots a hole 
in Jeff’s canteen, bringing it about that he would die in the desert, whether 
or not there had been water in the canteen, and this bringing it about that 
Jeff would have died, even if I had not substituted sand for water in his 
canteen.  This might be thought to pose a difficulty for a counterfactual de-
pendence account: In the circumstances, as the situation is described, Jeff 
would die whatever I do, and Jeff would die whatever Michael does, so nei-
ther Michael’s action nor mine is a but-for cause of Jeff’s wrongful death, so 
it is not counterfactually true, in the situation, (1) that if I had not put the 
sand in his canteen, all else being the same, Jeff would have lived, nor is it 
true (2) that if Michael had not shot a hole in the canteen, all else being the 
same, Jeff would have lived.  So, the claim goes, on counterfactual depend-
ence construals of moral wrongness, neither Michael nor I acts wrongly. 
                                                 
10. Derek Parfit discusses similar cases, including cases in which, he claims, many people to-
gether cause grave harm, but no individual’s contribution makes any perceptible difference. 
DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS (1984). See Kagan, supra note 8. 
7
Pogge: Appendix C: Comments by Richard Arneson
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
ARNESON COMMENTS  2014 
110 YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J. [Vol. XVII 
 
This surely defeats the counterfactual dependence account.  It is true of 
course, that Michael and I together killed and indeed murdered Jeff and we 
together acted wrongly in doing so. 
The analysis of such cases is surely going to be delicate, but I deny that 
there is an insuperable problem here for a counterfactual dependence ac-
count of the moral constraints that should play a role in a reasonable deon-
tological nonconsequentialist morality.  First, look at Dick’s action.  He acts 
with evil intent, and what he does is clearly wrong in the evidence-relative 
sense (he has no clue that Michael is going to be shooting at the canteen lat-
er).  And in the fact-relative sense, he does make a difference.  He brings it 
about, as I mentioned previously, that whatever Michael does, Jeff will die, 
and will in fact die a wrongful death.  This is so even though his act is not a 
but-for cause of death, nor is it obviously the cause of death in the ordinary 
colloquial sense, nor is it the case that if Dick had not put  sand in the can-
teen, Jeff would not have died, and would not have suffered wrongful 
death. Regarding Michael, we should note that he acts wrongly in the evi-
dence-relative sense, if he is unaware that there is sand in the canteen, and 
acts with the intent to murder, on the counterfactual dependence account, 
and if he is aware that there is sand in the canteen, and is not trying to kill 
Jeff, he does not act wrongly in the evidence-relative sense.  These seem to 
be the right judgments to make about Michael’s actions. 
Fifth example. Someone does something that seems pretty bad, wrong-
fully harmful, but preempts someone doing something worse.  Pogge dis-
cusses such cases to support the idea that actual causation is the key to the 
determination of deontological wrongdoing.  Suppose I cheat a poor Afri-
can farmer and carry out a fraudulent exchange at his expense, but if I had 
not done so, someone else would have interacted with the farmer and done 
worse.  Does the fact that a worse agent is waiting in the wings excuse my 
wrongdoing, Pogge asks?  He expects his readers to agree the answer is 
―No‖ and the reason has to do with the fact that my behavior actually 
caused wrongful harm. 
I disagree.  First, we need to be clear what the relevant set of options is.  
If in the right nonconsequentialist morality there is a very strong, enforcea-
ble component of morality consisting in a duty of beneficence, then maybe I 
act wrongly in interacting with this farmer by virtue of failing to carry out 
my beneficence duties, if they require me to act in a way that benefits him.  
(Even if my beneficence obligation gives me some leeway as to whom to 
aid, perhaps any course of actions I could take that would fulfill my benefi-
cence duties would involve helping this African farmer.) 
Second, we need to distinguish evidence-relative and fact-relative per-
missibility.11  If on the facts as described, in the evidence-relative sense, 
what I do is impermissible, and done with malicious, evil motive, or simply 
with a motive that fails adequately to embrace concern for the interests of 
those who are or might be affected by what I do, in the counterfactual de-
                                                 
11. See PARFIT, supra note 10. 
8
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pendence sense, that result seems to me clearly on the right track and  ade-
quate in itself to show the counterfactual dependence view is not leading us 
astray.   If I know that if I don’t cheat the farmer, someone else will cheat 
him in a way that will be worse for her, and there is no way I can interact 
with her without cheating (that would not be worse for her), and if I have 
no alternative course of action such as just helping her without going 
through the rigamarole of exchange, then I say, what I do is fact-relative 
and evidence-relative permissible.    If some of the knowledge claims just 
assumed become false factual beliefs, but beliefs that coincide with the evi-
dence available to me, then in the evidence-relative sense, my cheating the 
farmer is morally permissible.  If what I do, when I just intend to cheat and 
have no belief about what would happen if I did not cheat her, but the facts 
are such that my cheating the farmer makes her better off not worse off, and 
does not involve violation of any mandatory beneficence obligation I have 
toward her, then in the fact-relative sense, what I do is morally permissible.  
These judgments all seem correct, or at least very plausible and justifiable 
pending some counterargument.  So the counterfactual dependence ac-
count of moral constraints is not impugned by this sort of example. 
Suppose we should accept the claims I have been urging about (1) the 
independence of collective moral responsibility and assessment from indi-
vidual moral responsibility and assessment when the individual is or could 
become a member of the collective, (2) the fact that the moral constraints in 
deontological morality should be understood as defined in terms of coun-
terfactual dependence not actual causation, and (3) the relevance of motive 
and intention in determining the permissibility status of what agents do as 
well as the moral praiseworthiness and blameworthiness of agents in doing 
what they do (or omit).  These claims do not overturn Pogge’s claims about 
how collective responsibility and individual moral responsibility interact 
and how individuals can be and actually generally are wrongfully harming 
the poor by benefiting from and supporting the global political order, but 
they surely radically shift our understanding of what has to be shown to 
vindicate Pogge’s claims. 
Just assume for the sake of the argument that the global economic order 
is unjust and wrongfully harms the poor.  This is a collective agency claim.  
Nothing follows about what individuals morally must do or ought to do.  
For all that has been said, perhaps when I benefit from the global political 
order, my benefiting does not make a difference to the global poor, does not 
in any way constitute wrongful harming of them.12  Maybe the unjust glob-
                                                 
12. Andrew Altman and Christopher Wellman espouse a view on benefiting from an unjust 
order that differs from the line this comment affirms.  They say that it may be acceptable to 
accept benefits of injustice provided it is difficult or very costly to refrain from accepting the 
benefits and provided one compensates the people treated unjustly. by working to end the in-
justice in question. ANDREW ALTMAN AND CHRISTOPHER HEATH WELLMAN, A LIBERAL THEORY 
OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE ch. 6 (2009). Whether or not one agrees with their specific proposal 
(I do not), this illustrates the point that it is not straightforward, what a deontological morality 
ought to say about the permissibility or otherwise of benefiting from immoral actions (one’s 
own or others).  My own doubts about their view start by wondering: If there is a problem 
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al order builds a bridge and I benefit by driving over the bridge, but if I had 
not done so, others would have, or anyway my refraining from benefiting 
would in no way advance the cause of the global poor.   Then maybe I am 
not doing anything impermissible and not morally at fault in taking ad-
vantage of the bridge.  Or maybe after more reflection we should see that I 
am  doing what is morally wrong.  We need to analyze the case with the 
tools I have suggested we need to use.  What is clear is that what Pogge 
says does not so far warrant the conclusion he wants to draw—we wrong-
fully harm the global poor. 
What holds for benefiting from the global political order also holds for 
supporting the unjust political order.  Suppose I vote for Bernie Sanders of 
Vermont, who was a liberal member of Congress.  Suppose, as I am sure is 
true, that he does things that prop up the global economic order, which we 
are supposing is unjust.  Still, maybe my vote is inconsequential—makes no 
difference to anyone.13  Or maybe my failure to vote for a candidate run-
ning against Sanders, a radical Green party member who unlike Sanders is 
a true fire-breathing opponent of the global political order, is inconsequen-
tial, because the candidate would have received no more than ten votes 
even if I had voted for him—not enough to win.   If these are the facts, and I 
appreciate them, then my failing to vote for the Green Party fire-breather is 
not morally impermissible in either the fact-relative or evidence relative 
senses.  Maybe the facts are different.  Maybe votes indicate support for just 
or unjust policies, and the more injustice is supported at the polls, the more 
imperialists and colonialists and neo-liberal globalizers feel free to do bad 
deeds.  Maybe even one vote more or less for injustice makes a difference, 
or expectably might make a difference.  Then if I am deciding whether to 
vote or instead take my mother out for a beer, I must weigh the difference I 
would make, being convivial with my mother, versus the difference I 
would make, voting against injustice by voting for the doomed candidate.  
In a  deontological framework, I should give more weight, in determining 
what I should do,  to negative duties not to harm that to positive duties of 
beneficence (though I have suggested that a reasonable deontology will 
make beneficence a morally very large component of my duties).  But un-
                                                                                                                 
about accepting benefits of injustice, why is working to do away with the injustice adequate to 
deal with the problem?  The chances one’s advocacy for justice will be effective may be slight, 
or even nonexistent. One might suppose that if one accepts ill-gotten gains, one must compen-
sate and maybe fully compensate those who have been treated unjustly. And how much com-
pensation is owed?  Suppose one gets a huge benefit from ill-gotten gains (the bad dictator 
builds economic infrastructure that is incredibly productive).  Suppose the unjustly treated 
lose $10 in total but the total benefits to passive recipients of ill-gotten gains is, in aggregate, 
$30.  Must one give the whole $30 back to the unjustly treated, or $10, or must each passive 
recipient give back a per capita share of the $10, or of the $30, or what?  
13. See JASON BRENNAN, THE ETHICS OF VOTING (2011) (containing a thorough analysis of the 
causal consequences, or lack thereof, of individual acts of voting.)  Brennan opts for a moral 
view that espouses deontological duties regarding voting that do not turn on whether one’s 
vote makes any difference to what happens.  For example, he holds it is morally wrong to vote 
if you do not have reasonable grounds for believing you are voting for the just cause, the side 
that is morally right – a view which conflicts with the view I assert in this comment. 
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less we are moral absolutists who say moral duties not to harm wrongfully 
may not be acted against come what may, whatever the consequences for 
nonrightholders if we do not act in this case against the constraining moral 
duty, then sometimes the calculation will, for example, yield the result that 
I morally may or must be convivial with my mother even at a cost of (very 
slightly) supporting injustice.  
So ―Are We Violating the Human Rights of the World’s Poor?‖  My 
suspicion is that we are, and on a massive scale.  But I do not see that the 
framework of analysis that Pogge proposes and the arguments he makes 
are together adequate to yield an answer to his question.  And so far as I 
can see, this result is robust with respect to the extent to which we agree or 
disagree with his controversial empirical claims woven into his arguments.      
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